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Abstract. As argumentation theory has moved away from classical logic as a standard, sources have 
played an increasingly important role in the psychology of argumentation. Considering the 
connections between arguments and their sources is important for both descriptive and normative 
projects. This chapter draws together different strands of research in the psychology of argumentation 
and their differing views on source characteristics: namely, procedural rules, pragmatics, 
argumentation schemes and Bayesian Argumentation. We argue for a reconciliation of these different 
approaches around a probabilistic notion of relevance.   
1. Introduction 
To have a theory of argumentation requires us to choose from, or weave together, different 
senses of the term ‘argument’.  An argument can be a reason given in support of an action 
or idea. Relatedly, an argument can be the combination of the reason and the claim it is 
taken to support. In other words, an argument, as an inferential argument, will be a set of 
premises (evidence) and a conclusion (claim) bound together in some way. Lastly, an 
argument can be a dialogue in context: a dialectical process in which discussants propose 
and oppose claims. These argumentative dialogues vary in character, including, for 
instance, both reasonable attempts to resolve or clarify an issue and personal conflicts in 
which participants verbally hit out at each other (for a typology, see Walton, 2008). 
Different theories of argumentation have focused on different senses of the word 
‘argument’ and, hence, on different aspects of argumentation (on different senses of 
‘argument’ see also O’Keefe, 1977, and Hornikx & Hahn, 2012).  
Classical logic focuses on the inferential object sense. Thus, arguments are sets of 
propositions linked through a set of logical rules (see, for instance, Arthur, 2011), and 
arguments are sound solely in virtue of their structure and the truth of their premises. But 
since at least Toulmin (1958), argumentation theory has taken a dialectical turn: theories 
emphasize an argument’s use in context. This dialectical turn brings the different senses of 
argumentation tightly together. Arguments are reasons for actions or ideas, but they are 
reasons for someone: that is, they are relative to the arguer and audience. And while 
arguments may have a complex structure, even as inferential objects, they are, on this view 
properly understood only as part of the wider argumentative process.  
In the same way that a dialectical perspective brings together argument and recipient, it 
also brings into view the argument’s proponent. Historically sources (to wit, proponents of 
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arguments) have been treated as irrelevant to argument quality. On this view, a source’s 
standing should neither improve nor worsen an argument. Hence, numbering among the 
traditional fallacies are appeals to a source’s expertise (argumentum ad verecundiam) or 
arguments attacking a source (argumentum ad hominem) (Hahn, Oaksford, & Harris, 2012). 
However, while such a view seems natural from a logical perspective, the dialectical turn 
means that arguments and sources can no longer be treated as wholly separable. Arguments 
always come from a source, and properties of the source bear on the strength of the 
argument. For instance, as we will see below, sources seem subject to procedural rules that 
govern dialogue; if they violate these rules, they risk rendering their contributions 
inappropriate or unreasonable.  
In this chapter we will discuss the multiple, intrinsic connections between arguments 
and their sources. We will outline the different approaches taken to accounting for the role 
of sources, and argue for a division of labour between the approaches.  
2. Procedural Rules  
In argumentation theory, a large and influential body of work situates arguments firmly in 
the context of discourse. This work focuses on deriving procedural rules for arguments, 
which is to say principles for how discussants should reasonably behave. Procedural rules 
bear the imprint both of Toulmin’s seminal work on the use of arguments and of natural-
language pragmatics.  
Pragmatics resists straightforward definitions (Huang, 2007; Levinson, 1983). But 
popular definitions set pragmatics alongside semantics: both are the study of (or mental 
faculties for) meaning, distinguishable (crudely) in the following ways. Semantics treats the 
meanings of words and sentences in abstract. Pragmatics treats the meanings of words and 
sentences as used by a speaker in a specific context. Hence, we can speak of sentence 
meaning (semantics) and utterance meaning (pragmatics) (Levinson, 1983). Pragmatics 
includes a wealth of information that speakers intentionally communicate but leave 
implicit. Hence, we can also speak of a code and inference model of language: semantics is 
the code, associating words, concepts and the world; pragmatics is the inference, linking the 
code to the speaker’s intended meaning (Clark, 2013).  
One account of procedural rules dominates the literature: namely, pragma-dialectics 
(see, e.g., van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 1984, 1992, 2004). Pragma-dialectics views 
argumentation as “verbal moves ideally intended to resolve a difference of opinion” (van 
Eemeren & Grootendorst, 1995). On this view, argumentation theory becomes a sort of 
complex pragmatics, the aim of which is to analyze speech acts that are chained together in 
argument. Pragma-dialectics breaks argumentative discourse down into various stages. 
During the confrontation stage, discussants encounter a difference of opinion. During the 
opening stage, they identify themselves and establish their initial standpoints. During the 
argumentation stage, they begin the discussion proper, outlining their standpoints and 
defending them against critical questioning. During the conclusion stage, the discussants 
reach their final standpoints: ideally they reach agreement. Complementing these stages is a 
set of procedural rules, which draw on Grice’s (1975) Cooperative Principle and Maxims of 
Conversation. The rules derive from the qualitative study of real arguments. Table 1 below 










Standards of Fairness Pragma-dialectic Rules 
I. Faulty Arguments  
(1) Violation of Stringency 
Arguments presented non-stringently 
(1) Freedom Rule 
Don't prevent advancing standpoints or 
questioning them 
(2) Refusal of Justification 
No, or insufficient reason, given for 
assertion 
(2) Burden of Proof Rule 
Must defend standpoint when requested 
II. Insincere Contributions  
(3) Pretence of Truth 
Assertion known to be false, or 
subjectively true, presented as objectively 
true 
(3) Standpoint Rule 
Only attack standpoints that have really 
been introduced 
 
(4) Shifting of Responsibility 
Unwarranted denial, claim or transfer of 
responsibility 
(4) Relevance Rule 
Real arguments, relevant to standpoint 
(5) Pretence of Consistency 
Arguments presented that are 
incongruent with actions/other arguments 
(5) Unexpressed Premise Rule 
Don't falsely attribute implicit premises 
or deny your own 
 
III. Unjust arguments  
(6) Distortion of Meaning 
Intentional distortion of any contributions 
or facts 
(7) Impossibility of Compliance 
Don't demand anything of others that you 
know they won't be able to do. 
(6) Starting Point Rule 
Don’t falsely present or deny an 
accepted starting point 
(7) Validity Rule 
Supposedly conclusive arguments must 
be logically valid 
(8) Discrediting of Others 
Intentional or negligent discrediting of 
other participants 
(8) Argument Scheme Rule 
Non-conclusive arguments must respect 
argument schemes 
IV Unjust interactions  
(9) Expressions of Hostility 
Don't treat your adversary as your enemy 
(9) Concluding Rule 
Respect inconclusive and conclusive 
defences in settling argument 
(10) Hindrance of Participation 
Don't impede others' participation 
(10) Usage Rule 
Don't use confusing/ambiguous 
language; don’t intentionally 
misinterpret opponent’s language 
(11) Breaking Off 
Don't break off argumentation without 
justification. 
 
Table 1. Fairness Rules versus Pragma-dialectic Procedural Rules; wordings adapted from Schreier et al 
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To illustrate, consider the first two rules: 
 
Rule 1 (Freedom Rule): Discussants may not prevent each other from advancing 
standpoints or from calling standpoints into question.  
 
Rule 2 (Burden of Proof Rule): Discussants who advance a standpoint may not 
refuse to defend this standpoint when requested to do so.  
(van Eemeren, Garssen, & Meuffels, 2009, pp. 21-22) 
 
These rules have good face validity: we would intuitively consider someone who followed 
the rules reasonable, and someone who violated them unreasonable. The rules also 
potentially account for certain fallacies. A discussant, for instance, might violate the 
Freedom Rule by threats of force (argumentum ad baculum) or appeal to compassion 
(argumentum ad misericordiam) or personal attack (argumentum ad hominem) (van 
Eemeren & Grootendorst, 1995). A discussant might violate the Burden of Proof Rule by 
refusing to justify his/her own standpoint, instead challenging his/her opponent to disprove 
it  (van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 1995).  
Pragma-dialectics has accumulated considerable evidence to support its procedural 
rules. Much of this evidence is naturalistic (e.g. van Eemeren & Houtlosser, 1999), but 
lately there has been an increasing interest in experimental investigations (van Eemeren, 
Garssen, & Meuffels, 2012; van Eemeren et al., 2009). These experiments typically present 
short arguments that respect or violate procedural rules. Participants tend to judge 
arguments that respect the rules as reasonable and those that violate the rules as 
unreasonable. Pragma-dialectic rules also fare well with extended arguments: witness van 
Eemeren and Houtlosser’s (1999) detailed discussion of a sophisticated 63-line argument.  
These data suggest that insight can be gleaned from generalized rules that treat 
procedure rather than specific content. But in the rules’ procedural nature lies an important 
limitation, for the rules do not ultimately measure the strength of a specific argument. 
Imagine, for instance, an argument between two perfectly reasonable discussants, in the 
sense that they obey all the procedural rules. Procedural rules do not give us a way to 
decide between these discussants’ positions. Who should we take to have provided the 
stronger argument?  
There is also the question of how binding these pragma-dialectic rules are. As we have 
seen, these rules derive from the study of real arguments, much in the same way that 
Grice’s maxims derived from the study of real language use. But it is not clear how and 
why pragma-dialectic rules have normative force. It might be desirable to follow the rules: 
our arguments might be more civilized if we did. It might also be practical to do so: our 
arguments might be more persuasive if we did. But it is not obviously irrational to disobey 
the rules, in the way that it is irrational to disobey the rules of logic.  
An alternative set of procedural rules comes in the form of fairness rules for 
argumentation (Christmann, Mischo, & Flender, 2000; Christmann, Mischo, & Groeben, 
2000; Mischo, 2003; Schreier, Groeben, & Christmann, 1995). This theory takes as its goal 
an account, not of reasonableness, but of fairness. That is, the theory is intended as an 
ethical theory, not an epistemological one (Schreier et al, 1995). According to Christmann, 
Mischo and Flender (2000), fair argument is governed by rationality and argumentation. 
There are, on this account, four general aspects to fair argumentation: formal validity 
(covering, in some unspecified way, abduction, deduction and induction); sincerity or truth; 
justice; and procedural justice. Arguments are judged unfair if there is rule violation and 
subjective awareness, that is, if the violator was aware of or intended the violation. Fairness 
is also subject to contextual factors. The following factors, due to Christmann, Mischo and 
Groeben (2000), count as mitigating circumstances. (1) Variables in the exchange: the rule 




violator may, for example, notice the violation, and make amends for it. (2) Person 
variables: the rule violator may prove incompetent rather than intentionally unfair. (3) 
Situation factors: the fairness of moves seems to depend on whether the argument is 
planned or unplanned, public or private, prepared or unprepared. 
This fairness account has been subjected to empirical testing in the following ways. To 
compile a detailed list of fairness rules, Schreier et al. (1995) had participants rate the 
fairness of 35 commonly discussed rhetorical strategies and classify them into the four 
general aspects of fair argumentation mentioned above. A cluster analysis then revealed 11 
clusters, which are presented in the left-hand side of Table 1 above. Christmann, Mischo 
and Groeben (2000) then tested these rules by presenting participants with scenarios that 
varied in their degree of conformity to fairness rules, in their contexts, and in the degree of 
subjective awareness shown. Participants indicated whether they would personally reproach 
a transgressor (in Christmann et al.’s terms, the ‘objective data’), and gave a free response 
to an open-ended question asking them to indicate which aspects of the scenarios most 
influenced their decision (in Christmann et al.’s terms, the ‘subjective data’). The resulting 
data suggested that participants were sensitive to violations of fairness rules, and that these 
violations could be mitigated by contextual factors. Rule violations and contextual factors 
significantly affected fairness judgments for both objective and subjective data. However, 
subjective awareness (whether a violation was intentional) significantly affected judgments 
only in the subjective data, thus offering somewhat weaker evidence of its importance. 
Fairness rules offer a similar picture of argumentation to procedural rules, as witnessed 
by the overlap between the sets of rules in Table 1. This similarity raises the question of 
whether the theories are meaningfully distinct. Nevertheless, that these theories are so 
similar, and can both call on supporting data, suggests that they are tapping into a real 
phenomenon. Fairness rules do not, however, add an ultimate measure of argument 
strength.  
Thus far, the source of an argument has been somewhat spectral: procedural rules 
invoke the arguer, but only in a highly generalized way. Pragma-dialectics makes more 
concrete reference to discussants as people through the notion of strategic maneuvering. On 
this view, argumentation has a dual purpose, discursive and rhetorical: that is, 
argumentation is aimed at resolving a difference but also at doing so in one’s own favor 
(van Eemeren & Houtlosser, 1999). In strategic maneuvering, discussants take advantage of 
‘topical potential’.  Protagonists have available to them, in any given context, a large set of 
potential topics and argumentative moves, from which they can select the best candidates to 
achieve their goals. Thus, protagonists can strategize throughout the dialogue. The 
following points are due to van Eemeren and Houtlosser (1999). At the confrontation stage, 
a protagonist can choose a standpoint to minimize the ‘disagreement space’. To wit, if a 
protagonist chooses a standpoint fairly close to their antagonist’s, there will be less 
persuading to do. At the opening stage, she can target the most helpful concessions from 
her antagonist. At the argumentation stage, she can choose the most strategic line of 
defense. And at the conclusion stage, she can invoke the happy consequences of accepting 
her standpoint, or the unhappy consequences of not accepting it. All this must be achieved 
without flouting the antagonist’s expectations and preferences. It should be clear that this 
strategizing places a heavy demand on protagonists. The protagonist, for instance, must 
formulate general goals and specific strategies to achieve them, and must anticipate and 
compare the antagonist’s responses to a range of hypothetical strategies.  
There is a body of evidence to support strategic maneuvering, both within pragma-
dialectics and in neighboring social psychology. Strategic maneuvering has been tested in 
recent experimental work on ad hominem arguments (van Eemeren et al., 2012). An ad 
hominem argument is an attack against the person, typically occurring in response to 
another argument. The protagonist of an ad hominem argument does not attack the content 
Peter Collins and Ulrike Hahn 
134 
 
of the original argument but rather its protagonist, dismissing them as a source. Ad 
hominem arguments are sometimes legitimate, as, for example, when levelled against an 
argument from expertise, in which the source’s expertise is the crucial factor. But ad 
hominem arguments are very often considered unreasonable or abusive (Walton, 1998).  
Van Eemeren et al. (2012) presented participants with ad hominem arguments in 
various forms: as straightforwardly abusive arguments, as disguised abusive arguments, and 
as legitimate personal attacks. For present purposes, the crucial distinction is between 
straightforward and disguised abusive arguments. The disguised argument was an abusive 
ad hominem attack made in the guise of a legitimate personal attack, as in the following 
item from their materials: 
 
Context: The art museum is renovated and that is the reason why it has been 
inaccessible to the public for some time. The museum curator discusses this with a 
journalist. 
Curator: I think the museum can be open again for the public. The building is in 
excellent shape now and it is perfectly safe. 
Journalist: As a curator you may know about art but you are not knowledgeable 
about the safety of the building. 
 
The point, here, is that it is quite reasonable for a curator to know about the health and 
safety aspects of his building, and to be able to testify about these matters. Hence, the attack 
is only superficially legitimate. Van Eemeren et al. found that participants considered 
straightforwardly abusive ad hominem arguments unreasonable (M = 2.44 on a scale from 
1-7 where 1 is ‘very unreasonable’ and 7 is ‘very reasonable’) and disguised abusive ad 
hominem arguments significantly less so (M = 4.09).  
Elsewhere, O’Keefe (2009) has linked strategic maneuvering to a large body of research 
in persuasion theory. He interprets strategic maneuvering somewhat broadly to include 
various presentational devices, which is to say ways of portraying the same information. 
Presentational devices do seem to affect persuasion. Arguments are more persuasive when 
they contain explicit conclusions, identify their sources, are more complete, or use 
figurative language (O’Keefe, 2009). Arguments are also more persuasive when they are 
culturally adapted to their audience (O’Keefe, 2009). But all these effects are rather small 
(effect sizes up to d=0.28/r=0.141).  
3. Pragmatics 
Pragmatics has featured so far as the inspiration for procedural rules. As we have seen, 
pragma-dialectics, for instance, draws on Grice’s (e.g. 1975) work to cast argumentation as 
a complex series of speech acts. However, pragmatics bridges content and source in its own 
right. 
Pragmatic theories generally hold that comprehension is based in large part on making 
assumptions about the source. Indeed, comprehension is often thought to require 
recognition of (or at least making assumptions about) speakers’ intentions. Take the 
following stock examples, presented here as in Clark (2013): 
 
                                                 
1 Cohen (1988, 1992) makes the following suggestions for interpreting effect size. d = 0.2 is small; d = 0.5 is 
medium; d = 0.8 is large. r = 0.1 is small; r = 0.3 is medium; and r = 0.5 is large. Note that, unlike d, r is capped at 
1, a perfect correlation. 




(1) Those spots mean she’s got measles.  
(2) Those three rings on the bell (of the bus) mean that the bus is full.  
 
Sentence (1) is an example of natural meaning: we can infer something from the state of the 
world (Grice, 1957/1989; Clark, 2013). Sentence (2) is an example of non-natural meaning: 
the hearers of the bell can infer that the bus is full because that is what the bus driver 
intended them to infer (Grice, 1957/1989; Clark, 2013). More formally, non-natural 
meaning is defined as follows:  
 
“U meant something by uttering x” is true iff, for some audience A, U uttered x 
intending: 
(i) A to produce a particular response r. 
(ii) A to think (recognize) that U intends (i). 
(iii) A to fulfil (i) on the basis of his fulfilment of (ii).  
(Grice, 1969/1989, p. 92) 
 
Subsequent work has considered this definition too broad, and added that the speaker’s 
intentions must be part of mutual knowledge – mutual, that is, between the speaker and 
hearer (e.g. Clark, 1996; Schiffer, 1972; Strawson, 1964; though see Sperber & Wilson, 
1995, for further qualifications). It follows from this definition that comprehension requires 
extensive assumptions about the source of an utterance and, by extension, that 
comprehension of an argument requires extensive assumptions about the source of 
utterances chained together in argumentation (Breheny, 2006). Equally, when crafting their 
utterances, or arguments, sources must make assumptions about how their audience will 
receive them. This does not, of course, mean that all aspects of comprehension require such 
assumptions (see the definition of semantics and pragmatics above), but it does mean that 
full comprehension requires them.  
Alongside this definition of meaning we need an account of how people go about 
making reasonable assumptions about a source's intended meanings. Grice (1975) offered 
the following account in the form of the Cooperative Principle and complementary Maxims 
of Conversation:  
 
Cooperative Principle: 
“Make your conversational contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it 
occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are 




1. Make your contribution as informative as required (for the current purposes of 
the exchange) 
2. Do not make your contribution more informative than required. 
Quality: Super-maxim, “Try to make your contribution one that is true” 
1. Do not say what you believe to be false 
2. Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence 
Relation: Be relevant 
Manner: Super-maxim, “Be perspicuous” 
1. Avoid obscurity of expression 
2. Avoid ambiguity 
3. Be brief (avoid unnecessary prolixity) 
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4. Be orderly 
(Grice, 1975, pp. 45-46) 
  
For pragmatics to proceed, speakers observe or ostentatiously flout maxims. Hearers then 
calculate the intended implication (implicature). For example: 
Maxim Observed 
A: I’ve just run out of petrol. 
B: Oh, there’s a garage just around the corner.  
Implicature: A may obtain petrol there. 
 
Maxim Flouted 
A: Let’s get the kids something to eat.  
B: Okay, but I veto I-C-E-C-R-E-A-M.  
Implicature: B would rather not mention ice cream directly in case the children then 
demand some. 
(Levinson, 1983, pp. 104).  
 
Thus the maxims help to explain intuitions about qualitative linguistic data (for discussion, 
see, for example, Huang, 2007, and Clark, 2013), and have also proved a springboard for 
rich explorations of pragmatics. But, as Grice himself seems to have acknowledged, there is 
both vagueness and redundancy in the account (Clark, 2013). When it comes to discussion 
of natural conversations, most analyses end up citing the Maxim of Quantity and the 
Maxim of Relation, and it is difficult to tease the two maxims apart (Clark, 2013). This 
closeness raises the question of whether the maxims are genuinely distinct. Indeed, leading 
successors to Grice have re-worked the maxims, preferring a fleshed-out notion of quantity2 
(e.g. Horn, 1984, 1989, 2004) or of relevance (Sperber & Wilson, 1995). This fleshed-out 
relevance, embodied in Relevance Theory (Sperber & Wilson, 1995), has achieved greatest 
popularity.  
Relevance Theory takes cognition in general, and communication (pragmatics) in 
particular, to be geared towards the maximization of relevance. In other words, cognition 
and communication focus on deriving the greatest, positive cognitive effects (e.g. true 
conclusions, strengthened or contradicted assumptions) for the least processing effort 
(Clark, 2013). Speakers produce utterances that are worthwhile for the hearer to process, 
and as relevant as possible given speakers’ abilities and preferences (Clark, 2013; Sperber 
& Wilson, 1995). With this notion of relevance, the other maxims are arguably superfluous 
(for a discussion, see Sperber & Wilson, 1995, or Clark, 2013).  
There are, of course, alternative theories in both pragmatics (e.g. Levinson, 2000) and 
formal semantics (e.g. Jaszczolt, 2007; Kempson, Meyer-Viol, & Gabbay, 2000) that all 
aim at more minimal accounts than the Cooperative Principle and Maxims of Conversation. 
It suffices, however, to note that, while the theoretical framework of pragmatics has been 
reduced substantially, the purview of pragmatics has expanded. For Grice, semantics seems 
to have contributed what is said - roughly, the propositions expressed - and pragmatics what 
is meant (but not said) (Clark, 2013). On the whole, Grice's successors - and, certainly, 
relevance theorists - have argued that pragmatics contributes at even lower levels (Clark, 
2013). That is, we even need pragmatics to identify the propositions that we would intuit as 
being literally expressed.   
It is easier to appreciate how these aspects of pragmatics bear on argumentation by 
                                                 
2 As Clark (2013) argues, Horn’s Q and R principles (see references above) can be seen as an expanded version of 
the Maxim of Quantity: say enough, but not too much.  




referring to an example. Take, then, the following toy conversation and suggested 
pragmatic contributions, which broadly conform to the style of analysis used in Relevance 
Theory (see, for example, Clark, 2013).   
 
A: John looks grumpy.   
B: He hasn't had breakfast, so he is starving.   
(3) [John] hasn't had breakfast, so [John] is starving.   
(4) [John] hasn't had breakfast [today], so [John] is starving.   
(5) [John] hasn't had breakfast [today], so [John] is [very hungry].  
(6) [B believes that][John] hasn't had breakfast [today], so [John] is [very hungry].  
(7) [B believes that John looks grumpy because (or so B believes)[John] hasn't had 
breakfast [today], so [John] is [very hungry].   
 
Sentences (3) to (4) are low-level pragmatic intrusion into what is said: reference must be 
assigned to both instances of the deictic pronoun 'he'; temporal reference must be assigned 
to the sentence, as “John hasn't had breakfast” presumably does not mean that John hasn't 
ever had breakfast. Sentence (5) is needed to fix the sense of 'starving': the appropriate 
sense is 'very hungry', not 'in danger of death through malnutrition’. Sentence (6) makes 
clear that B is expressing his/her belief, a belief that corresponds to reality to a greater or 
lesser degree. Sentence (7), finally, identifies the real, but implicit, point of the utterance: a 
possible explanation for John's apparent grumpiness. There are two observations to make, 
here, about pragmatics and argumentation. Firstly, the pragmatic contributions above 
resemble an argument; together they seem to constitute a complex inferential object. 
Secondly, if pragmatic contributions like these are typical of comprehension, then they will 
also be typical of the comprehension of arguments. In other words, it is pragmatics that 
offers up the actual content of the argument; it is pragmatics that lets us understand what 
the argument actually is.  
How has pragmatics, in this sense, contributed to the study of argumentation? Certainly, 
pragmatics has contributed to the study of rationality more generally. Hilton (1995) 
considered the influence of pragmatics in developmental psychology, judgment and 
decision-making, and argued that, whenever we assess the rationality of participants’ 
behavior, we must also consider pragmatic cues in tasks. The provision of instructions and 
materials to participants in psychology experiments is a communicative situation, and 
participants will naturally draw on natural language pragmatics for their interpretation. 
Hilton (1995) provides examples of experimental findings on human (ir)rationality, such as 
the use of base-rate information, the presumed relevance of non-diagnostic information, 
false-memory effects, and the conjunction fallacy that may require some degree of 
questioning once the pragmatic context of the experimental situation, as viewed by the 
participant, is properly taken into account3.  
Hilton (1995) used a definition of pragmatics that is rather similar to that presented 
above, but included it in his broader Attributional Model. In this model, pragmatics has the 
crucial function of allowing inference to the source’s intentions. Crucial, too, is a link to 
stable attributes of the speaker: for example, to personality traits. Knowing about the 
speaker’s attributes, the hearer might modify their interpretation of the speaker’s intentions. 
To adapt Hilton’s (1995) example, imagine an underwhelming reference for a job. How 
                                                 
3 This is not to say that such biases of judgment and decision-making will necessarily disappear when pragmatics 
is factored in. The conjunction fallacy, for instance, is a robust effect: for discussion, see, for example, Jarvstad 
and Hahn (2011), and for experiments that control for pragmatic involvement, see Tentori and Crupi (2012). But, 
as the discussion of framing effects below shows, comprehensive pragmatic accounts are possible, and must be 
eliminated before judgment and decision biases can be proclaimed.  
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should we interpret this reference? If we know that the writer is generally generous with 
praise, producing glowing references, we will likely conclude that the reference is meant as 
a non-recommendation. By contrast, if we know that the writer is very cautious, or loath to 
give praise, then we will likely hesitate before concluding that the reference is bad.  
The Attributional Model calls for an integration of pragmatic inference with information 
about specific sources. This integration remains, to the best of our knowledge, 
underexplored. However, researchers have followed Hilton’s lead in assessing the impact of 
the experimenter’s presumed intentions, especially in the psychology of judgment and 
decision-making. For instance, Sher & McKenzie (2006) explored how participants 
responded to seemingly equivalent descriptions of cups as half-full or half-empty. 
Participants inferred from the description ‘half-full’ that the experimenter intended to refer 
to a cup that had previously been empty; from the description ‘half-empty’, to one that had 
previously been full. More generally, Mandel (2014) has argued that key framing effects – 
attribute and risky-choice frames – rely on the pragmatics of number terms. For instance, 
participants famously prefer options that will save 200 out of 600 lives to those that will 
result in the loss of 400 out of 600 lives, even though these situations are, on some 
readings, mathematically equivalent (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). Mandel (2014) has 
shown that such framing effects depend on participants assuming that the experimenter 
meant ‘at least 200/400 lives’, and that when the word ‘exactly’ is inserted, the framing 
effect disappears. It may well be that these much-vaunted equivalence framing effects – 
where the information content is supposedly equivalent but the persuasiveness differs – 
depend on pragmatic inference (for a discussion of equivalence frames, see the review of 
Levin, Schneider, & Gaeth, 1998).  
Likewise, pragmatics seems to play a role in another key phenomenon, reasoning from 
conditionals (‘if-then’ statements). In the famous Wason selection task (van der Henst & 
Sperber, 2004; for the original exposition of the selection task, see Wason, 1966), 
participants are tasked with testing a rule of the form ‘If P then Q’; the correct responses is 
checking ‘P’ and ‘not Q’. Consider, for instance, the following set of items, adapted from 
van der Henst & Sperber (2004)  :  
 
Rule: If there is a 6 on one of the card, there is an E on the other. 
Card 1: 6  Card 2: 7 Card 3: E Card 4: G 
 
The normative response is supposedly to turn over the cards ‘6’ and ‘G’ (at least on the 
rather dubious interpretation of natural language if-then as the material conditional of 
propositional logic). However, participants tend to turn over the cards ‘6’ and ‘E’; only 
around 10% choose the normative response (van der Henst & Sperber, 2004). These 
findings can be qualified in two ways. Firstly, more participants show the normative 
response in a deontic scenario (Griggs & Cox, 1982; van der Henst & Sperber, 2004). For 
instance, when testing the rule ‘If you are drinking beer (P), you must be 18 years old (Q)’, 
participants would turn over cards for ‘drinking beer’ (P) and ’16 years old’ (not Q) (van 
der Henst & Sperber, 2004). Secondly, alternative accounts suggest that testing P and Q 
may, in fact, be more informative (Oaksford & Chater, 1994). More importantly, for 
present purposes, is that varying the pragmatics of the materials also varies participants’ 
responses. Girotto et al. (2001) manipulated participants’ performance on a deontic version 
of the task. Participants saw the following instructions:  
 
Imagine that you work in a travel agency and that the boss asks you to check that the 
clients of the agency had obeyed the rule “If a person travels to any East African 




country, then that person must be immunized against cholera,” by examining cards 
representing these clients, their destinations and their immunizations. 
 
Participants then had to choose which of four cards to turn over, representing P (the person 
travels to an East African country), not P (the person does not travel to an East African 
country) and Q (the person is immunized against cholera) and not Q (no immunizations 
done). In this condition, the relevant goal is to prevent people travelling to East Africa 
unimmunized; the relevant tests are P and not Q. Participants did, indeed, tend to test cards 
corresponding to P and not Q. In another condition, the same participants read that the boss 
had been mistaken, and that cholera immunization is no longer required to visit East Africa. 
As a result, the boss is concerned that she has misinformed clients, causing them to follow 
an obsolete rule. In this condition, the relevant goal is to test whether people have been 
immunized unnecessarily; the relevant tests are P and Q. Participants did, indeed, tend to 
test cards corresponding to P and Q. Thus, Girotto et al. (2001) found evidence that 
pragmatics does indeed affect people’s reasoning.  
The preceding examples of the role of pragmatics in assessing experimentally human 
rationality, finally, are themselves simply expressions of a more fundamental pragmatic 
connection between content and source. As described above, pragmatics involves 
inferences about speaker intentions in the service of interpreting utterances. In the context 
of those inferences, hearers make a default assumption not only that communicated 
information should be relevant to them, but that it is so because speakers possess some 
(degree of) rationality. Among possible interpretations we choose (in the first instance) 
those that allow the speaker to be perceived as ‘making sense’ (on the so-called ‘principle 
of charity’ or ‘rational accommodation’ see e.g., Davidson, 1973; Quine, 1960, p. 59). 
In summary, utterance comprehension intrinsically connects content and source at a 
basic level. It is by making assumptions about an argument’s source that we understand the 
form and purpose of an argument. As we have seen, pragmatics has changed markedly 
since Grice, with a popular movement towards more streamlined theory but with wider 
scope. This raises the question of whether the streamlining of pragmatic theory can beget 
the streamlining of argumentation theory. We will return to this question below. Important 
though pragmatics may be in interpreting arguments, its role in evaluating the strength of 
arguments is less clear. The discussion in the following section moves towards a deeper, 
probabilistic notion of argument strength, but one that nevertheless reflects the importance 
of pragmatics through its link to more stable source characteristics such as source reliability 
(for extended discussion of this link, see McCready, 2014).  
4. Source Reliability  
As arguments occur in natural language, they are inherently subject to natural-language 
pragmatics. Pragmaticists after Grice have argued that pragmatics contributes even to the 
recovery of the literal proposition: that is, to understand what an argument even is, we need 
to use pragmatics. It follows from this account that, when they hear arguments, audiences 
must make considerable assumptions about a source. This account contrasts strongly with 
the dominant view on arguments and their sources in social psychology. In social 
psychology, fundamental aspects of communication are relegated to heuristic processes that 
can be turned on and off. 
Social psychology treats arguments in the context of persuasion. In other words, social 
psychology is primarily interested not in when arguments are ‘good’ but when they ‘work’. 
Though source characteristics feature heavily in the persuasion process, they have been 
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given a decidedly ‘second class’ role in argument evaluation, at least by the dominant 
models. In particular, the Elaboration Likelihood Model (ELM) separates persuasion into 
two different routes: the central and peripheral routes (e.g. Petty & Cacioppo, 1984; Petty & 
Cacioppo, 1986). In the central route, people engage in sustained and critical processing of 
an argument’s content. In the peripheral route, people evaluate an argument briefly or 
heuristically using source information or presentational features. Which route obtains is a 
function of the audience’s motivation and ability to analyze the issue at hand, with central 
processing being engaged only under conditions of high personal involvement.  
All of this sounds both surprising and problematic in light of the points raised in the 
preceding sections. In fact, it seems questionable whether it is even possible to understand, 
let alone be persuaded by, natural language arguments without at least some consideration 
of the source from which the argument or persuasive message is coming.  
This is not to doubt that social psychology has obtained findings that seem roughly 
compatible with source processing assigned to a lesser, ‘peripheral’ route which is used 
only on occasion, as contrasted with an analytic route focused on content. However, in light 
of the implausibility (and impossibility) of strict separation between content and source, 
these data would seem in need of re-interpretation and process accounts of persuasion 
which need to be revised in light of more careful consideration of what, if anything, about 
sources can and cannot be ignored.  
Not only does it seem difficult to ignore source considerations when evaluating 
arguments, it also seems normatively undesirable. Intuitively the reliability, veracity and 
competence of a reporting source seem informationally relevant (see also Schum, 1972). In 
keeping with this, sources feature more prominently in research into argumentation 
schemes (e.g.  Walton, Reed, & Macagno, 2008) and Bayesian Argumentation (see, e.g., 
papers in Zenker, 2012) – both of which have overtly normative concerns.  
When is information about sources relevant? There may be cases when the audience 
knows enough about a subject to evaluate an argument fully and ignore source information 
(Hahn et al., 2012). Perhaps, for example, when audiences encounter a deductive argument, 
they need not refer to source information as long as they accept the truth of the premises. 
Likewise, perhaps when audiences encounter an inductive argument, they need not refer to 
source information as long as they can independently corroborate the facts presented. One 
can, nevertheless, imagine many cases when source information will be relevant. Even in 
deductive arguments, we may need assurances about the truth of the premises before 
granting that the argument is sound. It remains possible that the degree of source 
involvement does and should differ across types of inference. When source information 
does contribute, however, to ignore it is to risk forming inaccurate beliefs.  
One way to capture sources is to treat source-related content through argumentation 
schemes – an approach that has been popular also in the context of ‘critical thinking’ (e.g. 
Inch & Warnick, 2009). Argumentation schemes represent patterns of inference in common 
types of argument as a way to get a handle on argument strength. Argumentation schemes 
have yielded considerable insight into common arguments. Many sets of schemes are 
available (e.g., Garssen, 1997; Hastings, 1962; Kienpointner, 1992; Perelman & Olbrechts-
Tyteca, 1969; Schellens, 1985), but probably the most extensive is Walton et al. (2008). 
According to Walton et al. (2008), schemes model arguments with defeasible reasoning: 
conclusions are held to be true or false but provisionally so; conclusions should be revised 
in light of new evidence. Defeasible reasoning contrasts with deductive reasoning, in which 
new information should not change a valid argument. Source content – indeed, argument 
content more generally – is represented in two ways. Firstly, content appears in the schemes 
themselves; secondly, it is probed in a corresponding set of critical questions. On this 
approach, hearers should judge an argument’s strength by identifying the relevant 
argumentation scheme, and trying to find acceptable answers to the critical questions. 




Walton et al. (2008) provide a set of a source arguments and attendant source fallacies (e.g. 
argumentum ad hominem, ad populum, ad verecundiam).  
We can best assess the strengths and weaknesses of argumentation schemes by 
considering some examples. We will consider the argument from expertise (argumentum ad 
verecundiam) and the argument from popular opinion (argumentum ad populum), our 
analysis following that of Hahn and Hornikx (2015). Walton et al. (2008) provide the 
following scheme and set of critical questions: 
 
Source E is an expert in subject domain S containing proposition A 
E asserts that proposition A (in domain S) is true (false) 
A may plausibly be taken to be true (false). 
(Walton et al., 2008, p. 14) 
 
How credible is E as an expert source? 
Is E an expert in the field that A is in? 
What did E assert that implies A? 
Is E personally reliable as a source? 
Is A consistent with what other experts assert? 
Is E’s assertion based on evidence? 
(Walton et al., 2008) 
 
On further consideration, though, the list of critical questions balloons: Walton et al. (2008, 
pp. 92-93) distinguish some 21 questions that might be relevant in different contexts. While 
this list demonstrates the depth of the analysis, it also demonstrates what Walton et al. 
(2008) call the completeness problem. Simply put, we can always think of new critical 
questions to ask. The completeness problem argues for a way to integrate source 
information with broader argument content in a way that allows for uncertainty and for 
appropriately hedged degrees of belief. The argument from popular opinion demonstrates a 
further limitation to argumentation schemes. The scheme for this argument is as follows:  
 
S1: Everybody (in a particular reference group) accepts that A. 
Therefore, A is true (or you should accept A). 
S2: Everybody (in a particular reference group) rejects A. 
Therefore, A is false (or you should reject A). 
 
CQ1: Does a large majority of the cited reference group accept A as true? 
CQ2: Is there other relevant evidence available that would support the assumption 
that A is not true? 
CQ3: What reason is there for thinking that the view of this large majority is likely 
to be right? 
(Walton et al., 2008, p. 123) 
 
Here there also seems to be some degree of question begging: CQ3 asks the same question 
that critical questions are supposed to address (Hahn & Hornikx, 2015). This problem of 
circularity indicates the need for supporting accounts of when such evidence can be 
diagnostic, can truly support a conclusion (for a discussion of Condorcet’s Jury theorem in 
this context, see Hahn & Hornikx, 2015). In other words, it is not clear when and why 
argumentation schemes are normatively binding. That is, while the schemes focus the 
attention on crucial aspects of common arguments, they do not necessarily compel an 
audience to accept the argument. Although this point is compounded by the completeness 
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problem, it would hold, nonetheless, even if we had a definitive set of critical questions for 
each scheme. We would also need a definitive set of standards for judging whether we have 
satisfactorily answered each question. Argumentation schemes do not offer such a set and, 
indeed, currently do not offer much insight into what satisfactory answers would look like.  
Such a normative basis might, however, be provided through the use of probability 
theory to capture uncertainty, degrees of belief, and varying diagnosticity of evidence in 
order to provide an explicit treatment of argument strength. Such an approach has come to 
be known as Bayesian Argumentation (see, for example, Hahn, Harris, & Oaksford, 2012; 
Hahn & Oaksford, 2006, 2007, 2012; Zenker, 2012). Through the application of Bayesian 
probability theory, Bayesian Argumentation also provides strong links to social 
epistemology, in which there are rich seams of work on sources and testimony that draw on 
the Bayesian framework to explicate intuitions on these topics within epistemology and 
philosophy of science (e.g. Bovens & Hartmann, 2002; Olsson, 2011; Olsson & Vallinder, 
2013; Zenker, 2012). Bayesian Argumentation extends the use of Bayesian probability 
theory from its now familiar use in the psychology of reasoning (Oaksford & Chater, 2007). 
Bayesian Argumentation allows degrees of belief, which are modelled as subjective 
probabilities, and Bayes’ rule allows calculation of the probability of a hypothesis or claim 
given the evidence (argument) for that claim. Bayesian Argumentation has much of the 
appeal of formal logic (in providing a well-founded mathematical formalism) while also 
handling the kinds of uncertain arguments that we typically encounter. It also provides a 
natural account of argument strength4 and of how we should adjust our beliefs in the light 
of new evidence (for specific examples see e.g., Hahn & Oaksford, 2007). What is more, 
Bayesian inference can be justified more broadly as a normative system. For instance, 
Bayesian inference has been shown to be an optimal form of inference5 (Leitgeb & 
Pettigrew, 2010a, 2010b; Rosenkrantz, 1992) and an effective strategy to avoid Dutch Book 
Arguments (for discussion, see  Corner & Hahn, 2012; Hahn, 2014).  
One project, here, then, is to recast argumentation schemes – such as the argumentum 
ad hominem, the appeal to expert opinion or the appeal to popular opinion – within the 
Bayesian framework and thus provide a normative basis for those schemes (see. e.g., Hahn 
et al., 2012; Oaksford & Hahn, 2012; Hahn & Hornikx, 2015, for Bayesian treatments of 
these schemes).  
Consideration of the effects of variation in the strength of argument and content and 
variation in the reliability of a reporting source within a Bayesian framework (see e.g., 
Hahn et al., 2009) leads to a very different perspective than that adopted by dual-route 
models of persuasion within the social psychology literature. Specifically, the 
multiplicative nature of Bayes’ rule implies statistical interactions between source 
reliability and evidence, not just additive effects. Hahn, Harris, and Corner (2009) found 
evidence of just such an interaction. They used experiments to explore evidence strength 
and source reliability, and found that when source reliability is high and evidence strong, 
there is an extra boost to argument strength.  
                                                 
4 The likelihood ratio (or its logarithm) is a traditional and influential Bayesian measure of the evidential support 
of given data for a hypothesis of interest (Brössel, 2013, offers a recent survey). Also, there is experimental 
evidence that this measure captures people’s judgments quite well at least in certain settings (see Tentori, Crupi, 
Bonini, & Osherson, 2007). From an argumentation perspective, however, it will not typically matter whether the 
likelihood ratio or other, alternative probabilistic measures of confirmation are chosen. What matters is that they 
afford quantitative measures of argument strength. 
5 Leitgeb & Pettigrew showed (see also D’Agostino & Sinigaglia, 2010, and Predd, Seiringer, Lieb, Osherson, 
Poor, & Kulkarni, 2009; Joyce, 1998) that, unless an agent A complies with a probabilistic representation of 
uncertain judgment and inference, there will always be an alternative (probabilistic) belief state which dominates 
A’s in epistemic accuracy.  
 




Closer consideration of how to model source reliability within the Bayesian framework has 
also drawn attention to other aspects of the relationship between arguments and their 
sources. In particular, sources are not only informative of argument content, but content 
may shape our views of the source. In particular, it seems intuitive that we may, in 
everyday life, use the content of what people say not just to revise our beliefs on the topic 
in question, but also to revise our beliefs about their reliability. Philosophers have, in recent 
years, been exploring the epistemological implications of using content to revise beliefs 
about source (see e.g., Bovens & Hartmann, 2003; Olsson, 2013; Schubert & Olsson, 
2012). These results shed light not only on fundamental philosophical questions, but also 
on practical problems such as argument within the climate debate (Hahn, Harris & Corner, 
2015) and suggest rich avenues for psychological research.  
For example, Collins, Hahn, von Gerber & Olsson (2015) recently examined how 
argument content is used to draw inferences about reliability. A set of experiments 
manipulated source reliability and evidence strength, the latter being operationalized as a 
simple distinction between expected and unexpected information (i.e. high/low prior 
probability). Consider, for example, the following set of items. In the task on argument 
convincingness, participants first provided a rating of the initial claim, then of the claim 
repeated with source information:  
 
Initial Claim: One of the best remedies against a severe cough is lots to drink, hot or 
cold. 
Repeated Claim: Now imagine that Michael, who is a clinical nurse specialist, told 
you the following: “One of the best remedies against a severe cough is valium.”  
 
And, in the source-reliability task, a separate group of participants first provided a rating of 
the source, then of the source after reading their claim:  
 
Initial source information: Michael is a drug addict.  
Claim: Now imagine that Michael told you the following. “One of the best remedies 
against a severe cough is valium.”  
 
Reliable sources significantly increased the perceived convincingness of an argument; 
unreliable sources decreased it. Expected information significantly increased the perceived 
reliability of a source; unexpected information significantly decreased it. These data also 
provide evidence for source anti-reliability: highly unreliable sources can cause people to 
revise their beliefs in the opposite direction of what the source is claiming. In short, these 
data provide evidence for an intimate relationship between arguments (claims) and their 
sources. Not only does source information affect perceived argument strength; argument 
(claim) strength also affects perceived source reliability.   
As we have seen, Bayesian models offer a subtle account of source reliability, and 
source reliability is a (relatively) stable attribute of discussants in argumentation. But 
source reliability is just one such attribute; there are doubtless many others. This raises the 
question of whether all such attributes can be handled in the same way. Recall the example 
of the reference for a job application, and generous versus the cautious referee. Both 
referees seem reliable as sources as long as we know of their attributes; nevertheless, we 
would interpret the evidence they offer in rather different ways. One of the strengths of the 
Bayesian framework is that all probabilistically relevant aspects can be handled in 
essentially the same way and thus inferentially integrated in probabilistic models.  
This is illustrated with a final example from the recent empirical literature. Harris, 
Corner, and Hahn (2013) explored how pragmatic inferences can be cashed out in terms of 
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Bayesian inference. Specifically, they considered the example of an underwhelming 
reference for a maths course. If, other things being equal, one received a reference stating 
only that “James is polite and punctual”, one would seem to be entitled to infer that the 
reference is unfavorable. The implication is a lack of recommendation. Formally, this is a 
type of argument from ignorance: the inference about James’ math skills follows from what 
is not being said, not from the fact that punctuality is negatively correlated with 
mathematical ability (see Harris et al., 2013 for details). This was borne out in an 
experimental condition that probed the effects of being told that James was punctual and 
polite in addition to being informed of his mathematical ability in the context of a fictional 
university application. Where no further evidence about James is provided by the referee 
(other than that he is punctual and polite), that is, no evidence of his mathematical ability is 
given, the impact of that failure should nevertheless be moderated by beliefs about the 
specific characteristics of the source. Whereas one would expect information on his 
mathematical ability from an ‘expert’ source (James’ maths teacher) the lack of such 
evidence from an inexpert source (James’ personal tutor, a history teacher) is less 
surprising. In keeping with this, Harris et al. (2013) found that the weak reference led to 
decreases in the belief that James should be admitted to a university mathematics course 
only when it came from the maths teacher.  
5. Integrating the Accounts  
We have discussed, so far, rather different accounts of argumentation and the considerable 
evidence that they can call on. These accounts differ considerably in their approach.  
Procedural rules focus on arguments as a dialectical process. Argumentation schemes focus 
on content, treating arguments as inferential objects. Bayesian Argumentation focuses on 
arguments both as claims and as inferential objects, factoring in assumptions about sources. 
Whereas procedural rules and argumentation schemes are largely qualitative accounts, the 
Bayesian framework is inherently quantitative, even though it may be used to draw purely 
qualitative evaluations. And whereas procedural rules are well-suited to extended 
arguments, argumentation schemes and Bayesian Argumentation tend to focus on smaller 
fragments (though see Kadane & Schum, 1996, for a Bayesian analysis of all the evidence 
in the Sacco and Vanzetti trial). Since argumentation is a complex business, it is hardly 
surprising that there should be different accounts focusing on different aspects. It would be 
desirable both to integrate these accounts, and to simplify the theoretical frameworks 
involved. We have already given some indication of ways in which this might be achieved, 
but further considerations on this issue for future research seem an apt way to conclude.   
We have suggested, above, that pragmatics could contribute more to argumentation 
theory when the developments since Grice are included. One way to simplify 
argumentation theory is to reduce the amount of things it has to explain. Perhaps some of 
the burden can be shifted to pragmatics, at least where we are concerned with mistaken 
reasoning rather than deliberate deception. Take, for example, the pragma-dialectic 
procedural rules. The rules draw on Gricean Maxims of Conversation: the Relevance Rule 
corresponds to the Maxim of Relation; the Usage Rule corresponds to the Maxim of 
Manner; and various rules (e.g. the Standpoint and Unexpressed Premise Rules) seem to 
echo the Maxim of Quality. Why not allow pragmatic principles to bear the load? We have 
also seen that pragmatics after Grice has tended to invoke fewer principles: most 
dramatically, Relevance Theory replaces Grice’s maxims with an expanded notion of 
relevance, which is supposed to apply to pragmatics and to cognition more generally 




(Sperber & Wilson, 1995). It is a tempting prospect that a more minimal set of pragmatic 
principles could account for good and mistaken reasoning.  
It is also possible to reconcile pragmatic and Bayesian inference. Indeed, there is an 
emerging field of probabilistic semantics and pragmatics (for an introduction, see Goodman 
& Lassiter, in press) and the Harris et al. (2013) example of James and his mathematical 
ability provides a simple example.  
In all of this, the notion of relevance is key. Relevance is a further point of contact 
between pragmatics and probabilistic reasoning. In Relevance Theory, relevance is still 
qualitatively defined: relevance arises out of a trade-off between positive cognitive effects 
and processing effort. But within probabilistic theories of reasoning there have long been 
suggestions that probability provides a natural vehicle for relevance, specifically in the 
form of the axioms of conditional independence (Hahn & Hornikx, 2015; Korb & 
Nicholson, 2011; Pearl, 1988). To clarify, Korb and Nicholson (2011) give the example of 
a simple causal model in which A causes B, which in turn causes C (i.e. A>B>C). Let us 
follow them in assuming that A is smoking, B is cancer, and C is dyspnea (shortness of 
breath). To quote,  
 
If we don’t know whether [a] woman has cancer, but we do find out she is a smoker, 
that would increase our belief both that she has cancer and that she suffers from 
shortness of breath. However, if we already knew she had cancer, then her smoking 
wouldn’t make any difference to the probability of dyspnea. That is, dyspnea is 
conditionally independent of being a smoker given the patient has cancer. (Korb & 
Nicholson, 2011, p. 39) 
  
The notion of conditional independence thus captures dynamic aspects of relevance: how 
(probabilistic) relevance changes as a result of what one come to know. Certainly, much 
remains to be done in testing how well probabilistic relevance captures the relevance of 
Relevance Theory and argumentation. In other words, does probabilistic relevance map 
onto the kinds of inference that are, or should be, made in argumentation? But a 
probabilistic notion of relevance has the potential to tie together research in Bayesian 
inference, pragmatics and argumentation theory.  
This is not to say that pragmatics and probabilistic reasoning can, together, say 
everything we might want to say about argumentation. Even if relevance proves useful in 
explaining, more minimally, various aspects of argumentation, it seems unlikely that it will 
account for the following points. Firstly, in pragmatics it can be relatively unimportant 
whether what is said is strictly true; hence in Relevance Theory, for instance, the Maxim of 
Quality is considered largely redundant (Clark, 2013). For instance, we do not expect 
utterances such as (8) and (9) to be strictly true:  
 
(8) A hundred people showed up to my party. 
(9) Aberdeen is five hundred miles from London.  
(Clark, 2013, p. 70) 
 
What is important is not the truth of such apparent claims but what the speaker meant 
(implicated) by them. In argumentation, truth seems to matter rather more. Indeed, 
argumentation theory has been partly motivated by the desire to avoid such counter-
intuitive inferences as the paradoxes of material implication: for instance, from ‘If P then 
Q’ and ‘Not P’, in propositional logic we can infer ‘Therefore Q’ (Arthur, 2011). Secondly, 
relevance does not capture what we might call the ethical aspects of argumentation. 
However well relevance treats accidentally bad reasoning, it will not extend to deliberate 
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bad, deceptive reasoning. There may be nothing inherently wrong, from the perspective of 
relevance, with committing an abusive ad hominem argument or threatening force 
(argumentum ad baculum) or deliberately misconstruing the opponent’s standpoints or 
implicit premises (straw man fallacy). If we want to rule out such arguments, we will have 
to have recourse to procedural rules of some kind. To explain why such arguments might be 
effective, however, we can invoke relevance and Bayesian inference.  
6. Conclusion 
We tentatively suggest the following division of labour for a unified approach to 
argumentation. It seems plausible that a unified framework will have a common core of 
relevance, and probabilistic reasoning may help tie together relevance in communication 
and argumentation. Bayesian inference provides a natural vehicle for assessing the 
normative strength of arguments, and for prescribing appropriate belief revision. Bayesian 
inference can also be used to formalize insights from other fields, for instance, from 
argumentation schemes (for discussion, see Hahn & Hornikx, 2015). Pragmatics provides a 
natural vehicle for studying how people (mis-)understand arguments. Insights from 
pragmatics have already seeped into argumentation theory through procedural rules, but a 
fuller pragmatic treatment might reduce the burden on argumentation theory, and allow a 
shorter list of procedural rules. Procedural rules, in turn, provide a natural vehicle for 
explaining what we have called the ethical aspects of argumentation: why arguments can 
seem fair or unfair. Together these approaches can offer a rich account of argumentation.  
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